

Common Core Lesson Plan

Topic: Middle East during the Cold War

Title: *Roots of Future Conflict*

The purpose of this lesson is to provide students with some perspective in understanding how current events can be dictated in many ways by the historical events that preceded them. In this case, they will see the roots of American involvement in the Middle East as an offshoot of the Cold War policy of containment. It would ideally be taught during the early Cold War unit, after the Korean War had been completed.

Resources (primary resource documents, artifacts, material needs, etc.)

- Middle East Map
- Israel Recognition Letter
- Eisenhower Diary Entry
- Eisenhower Diary (scaffolded)
- Primary Sources - Nine Newspaper Articles
- Cold War in the Middle East Newspaper Article Summary
- Eisenhower, Nasser, and the Battle for the Arab World Article

Common Core Standards

- RH 1-9

Essential Standards

- 8.H.1.2, 8.H.1.3, 8.H.1.5

Background Information

- At this point, students should have a basic understanding of both the history of the Middle East through the 20th Century and the global tension and competition caused by the Cold War. The first part would come through the 7th grade curriculum, and the second part would have been taught in the days leading up to this lesson.

Instructional Sequence (before, during, and after instruction)

Step 1

Teacher can write the words “Middle East” on the board and ask students to brainstorm what they know about it. Teacher can then project the map of the Middle East and ask students to add to their lists. When given enough time, students can share what they came up with. Use this as a way to re-familiarize students with the region and to distinguish fact from inaccuracies.

Step 2

Hand out copies of the Israel Recognition Letter to students in pairs. Ask them what the document means. Then have them try and predict what impact this action would have on the region of the Middle East (this may take some teacher explanation). Lastly, ask them if they would have taken this action had they been President. Have them write their response with a justification.

Step 3

Hand out copies of the Eisenhower Diary Entry in pairs, just to be read. Have students read in their pair. Allow them to discuss the document briefly. Assign each student the scaffolded version of the Diary Entry. Have them fill out individually. Discuss the answers, as they may vary from student to student. This can serve as a formative assessment when complete.

Step 4

Assign each of the students one of the nine newspaper articles from the era (either printed or digitally). Most classes will have at least two students per article, some three. Have students read and summarize their article to the best of their ability. They should focus on looking for bias and perspective as well as facts when reading. Then, have students share their observations from each article with the class, in chronological order. Students should fill out the article summary sheet as they hear each summary. This will give each student a summary of the nine articles upon completion.

Step 5

As an extension, assign the book review entitled *Eisenhower, Nasser, and the Battle for the Arab World* and the interview of Hermann Eilts, found at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saud/interviews/eilts.html>. Both give interesting accounts of the era, the first as a contemporary book review, the second as a firsthand account of the roots American involvement in the region.

Step 6

At the end of the unit on the cotemporary Middle East (modern day), revisit student findings from this lesson to add perspective to what they will learn in the time between.

MIDDLE EAST



This Government has been informed that a Jewish
state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition
has been requested by the ^{provisional} Government thereof.

The United States recognizes the provisional gov-
ernment as the de facto authority of the new ^{State of} ~~Jewish~~
~~state.~~ *Israel.*



*Approved
May 14, 1948.*

6.11

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

MB 77-71 #1
By J.W. Date 9-11-78

TOP SECRET



DIARY

March 28, 1956.

Memorandum from the Secretary of State, dated March 28, 1956, entitled "Near Eastern Policies", was brought to the White House at 4:30 on March 28, 1956, shortly after the President's return from White Sulphur Springs. Accompanying Mr. Dulles were: Herbert Hoover, Jr., George V. Allen, William M. Rountree, Reuben Robertson, Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford. Sitting in on appointment was Colonel Goodpaster, who will also prepare notes).

President dictated, after the meeting, as follows:

"This memorandum (attached) was brought to me by the Secretary of State in response to my request that he prepare a list of the things that might be done in the Middle East which could help stabilize the situation and give us a better atmosphere in which to work.

"I have authorized the State Department to start work on all of the attached points. A fundamental factor in the problem is the growing ambition of Nasser, the sense of power he has gained out of his associations with the Soviets, his belief that he can emerge as a true leader of the entire Arab world -- and because of these beliefs, his rejection of every proposition advanced as a measure of conciliation between the Arabs and Israel.

"Because of this, I suggested to the State Department that we begin to build up some other individual as a prospective leader of the Arab world -- in the thought that mutually antagonistic personal ambitions

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

might disrupt the aggressive plans that Nasser is evidently developing. My own choice of such a rival is King Saud. However, I do not know the man, and therefore do not know whether he could be built up into the position I visualize. Nevertheless Arabia is a country that contains the holy places of the Moslem world, and the Saudi Arabians are considered to be the most deeply religious of all the Arab groups. Consequently, the King could be built up, possibly, as a spiritual leader. Once this were accomplished we might begin to urge his right to political leadership. (Obviously this is just a thought, but something of the nature ought to be developed in support of the other suggestions contained in this memorandum).

"We had a long conversation deciding upon the kind of person who could direct and coordinate the campaign visualized in the memorandum. He will need quite a staff and some field organization, and it will be a real job to find the right man."



TOP SECRET

Why do you think the words
TOP SECRET are crossed out?

When was the document
declassified? Why did it take
so long?

Why underline the word
might?

What makes this a Cold War
issue?

Should the State Department
have the right to build up a
leader in another country?
Why or why not?

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Why would the President choose a man to be this leader if he did not know him?

Do you agree with his reasoning for choosing King Saud?

Who would provide the "field organization"?

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

might disrupt the aggressive plans that Nasser is evidently developing. My own choice of such a rival is King Saud. However, I do not know the man, and therefore do not know whether he could be built up into the position I visualize. Nevertheless Arabia is a country that contains the holy places of the Moslem world, and the Saudi Arabians are considered to be the most deeply religious of all the Arab groups. Consequently, the King could be built up, possibly, as a spiritual leader. Once this were accomplished we might begin to urge his right to political leadership. (Obviously this is just a thought, but something of the nature ought to be developed in support of the other suggestions contained in this memorandum).

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TOP SECRET

355 Vote Plan, 61 Oppose It; 26 Republicans Join Dissenters

By Carroll Kilpatrick
Staff Reporter

President Eisenhower won a substantial foreign-policy victory in the new Congress yesterday when the House approved his Middle East resolution by a vote of 355 to 61.

The decision came 25 days after the President's special plea to a joint session requesting authority to use American troops if any Middle Eastern country is attacked by Communist forces and requests American assistance.

The vote was not quite so overwhelming as the Administration had originally hoped. Thirty-five Democrats and 26 Republicans voted against the resolution. Two other Republicans were paired against it.

An earlier motion to recommit the resolution to the House Foreign Affairs Committee was defeated 191-45.

Opposition in Midwest

Principal opposition came from the Middle West. Seven Illinois Republicans opposed the President's request. Two years ago the House approved the resolution authorizing the President to protect Formosa against attack by a vote of 409 to 3.

Yesterday's dissenters reflected serious congressional unhappiness over the measure—an unhappiness which is provoking prolonged Senate inquiry and debate.

Sen. Joseph C. O'Mahoney (D-Wyo.) declared the resolution is a "violation of the Constitution" and "an invasion of congressional power." Sen. Estes Kefauver (D-Tenn.) said there was much displeasure but that no one yet had a clear-cut alternative to the proposal.

In addition to the authorization to use armed forces, the President is authorized to use in the next five months up to \$200 million from foreign aid funds for economic and military assistance in the Middle East.

Committees Hear Radford

Earlier yesterday, the combined Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees heard Adm. Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a three-hour closed session. They will meet again Friday to hear Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, also in executive session.

Committee sources said no reply had been received to the request sent to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to testify. Senate leaders would like to conclude the hearings next week.

Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), author of the resolution calling for a full-scale inquiry into Middle East policy since 1946, said Dulles would be asked to give detailed reports on his talks with heads of other nations. Fulbright called this "pertinent" information the committees are entitled to have.

Chairman Thomas S. Gordon (D-Ill.) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee said the House's "overwhelming vote, within little more than three weeks after receiving the President's request, is another proof that the so-called lower body of the Congress can act expeditiously and with statesmanship to meet an urgent situation."

Chou, Bulganin Denounce Ike Doctrine as Attempt To Enslave and Make War

By B. J. Cutler

N. Y. Herald Tribune News Service

MOSCOW, Jan. 18—The Soviet Union and Red China jointly warned tonight that they are ready to give nations of the Middle East "the necessary support" to resist the Eisenhower Doctrine.

This threat from the two most powerful Communist nations came in a 2000-word document signed by Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai at the close of the Chinese leader's 12-day visit to Moscow and the satellites.

The two nations set the stage for the warning by denouncing the President's program to restore stability to the Middle East as a "policy of aggression and preparation for war." The document then stated:

"The government of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples Republic resolutely condemn this policy of the United States and are prepared to continue to give the necessary support to the peoples of the Near and Middle East to avert aggression and interference into the affair of nations of this region."

[In Washington, the Associated Press quoted high officials as saying that the Peiping-Moscow denunciation had been expected and the United States would push ahead with its new Middle East policy if Congress approves it. They expressed confidence that the people of the Middle East would not be fooled into accepting Communist "protection."

[Belgrade, Yugoslavia, hailed the declaration. A spokesman said it stressed respect of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality of nations.]

Like previous Soviet threats against the carrying out of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the statement refrained from saying what action they would take if American troops were dispatched to the Middle East.

The statement repeated Communist charges that the United States seeks to replace Britain and France as the colonial master of the Arab world. It said the United States was trying to "suppress independence" and "enslave the people."

"The so-called Eisenhower Doctrine has precisely these purposes," it said.

Continuing all-out support of Egypt, both nations demanded that Britain, France and Israel pay Egypt full indemnification for damage

See CHOU, Page A 4, Col. 1

Red China, Russia Pledge To Fight Ike's Doctrine

caused by their "aggressive action."

Both nations, said the document, "resolutely oppose any intrigues by the imperialists to place the Suez Canal under international control."

In reviewing the anti-Communist revolution in Hungary, Chou went along with the Soviet policy of blaming the uprising on "imperialists."

On the critical problem of relations between the Communist states, the statement admitted there had been "mistakes and shortcomings," but insisted that these mistakes were now being "overcome and liquidated." They issued an impassioned call for the unity of the Communist camps and said the establishment of such unity was the highest duty of both governments.

The statement charged that "perfidious intrigues of imperialists" would fail in trying to use "chauvinism, narrow nationalist feelings, and certain remnants of national hostility" to undermine and divide Communist-bloc solidarity.

Emphasis on unity of the Communist world in the statement was taken to reflect concern in the Kremlin and Peiping over nationalist Communist tendencies in Poland and Hungary.

In a brief nod to national feelings, the document said "it is possible to combine unity of Socialists (Communist) countries and their independence."

It was thought significant that the statement did not refer to the "leading role" of Russia in the Communist bloc as Chou did in his public speeches here and in Poland and Hungary.

China said, in the document, that it wanted good relations with the United States. It

blamed the absence of such relations on the "pretensions of American monopoly circles to world domination, a policy of aggression and preparations for war."

[The communique added the two governments "fully support the struggles of the peoples and countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America against colonialism and efforts to strengthen their independence, sovereignty and freedom and to achieve industrial developments and economic self-sufficiency," the Associated Press reported.]

[On Far Eastern problems, the communique said, "both sides welcomed the re-establishment of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations and consider that the further encouragement of normalizing Chinese-Japanese relations must be put on the agenda.]

[Both sides consider, said the communique, that all closed military groupings (pacts) should be abolished and a system of collective peace and collective security should be substituted.]

Chou, who arrived in Moscow, Jan. 7, departed by Soviet jet airliner tonight for Tashkent in Soviet Central Asia. He will go on to Afghanistan, India and Nepal on a good-will mission before returning to Peiping.

Eisenhower Arrives in Tehran

By Merriman Smith

The Washington Post, Times Herald (1959-1973); Dec 14, 1959; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Washington Post (1877 - 1988) pg. A1

Eisenhower Arrives in Tehran

Nehru Joins Him in Aim For Peace

Ike Leaves India After Million Hail Him in New Delhi

By Merriman Smith
TEHRAN, Iran, Dec. 14 (Monday) (UPI)—President Eisenhower arrived in this oil-rich Middle East capital today to start the last half of his world peace tour. Another spectacular welcome greeted him.

He landed at Tehran at 12:10 a. m. (EST) after a 4-hour and 5-minute flight from New Delhi, India.

The President left New Delhi inspired by the cheers of a million people at an outdoor rally and bolstered by India's pledge of wholehearted support in his quest of peace.

There were no formal farewells. Mr. Eisenhower told Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, "Frankly, I have learned a little more here than I have in any other country."

Text of Eisenhower-Nehru
communique. Page A6.

Fit and happy, Mr. Eisenhower carried with him the adulation of the Indian nation, which gave him a reception unequalled in size and warmth and the pledge of officially neutral Nehru that India is closer than ever to the United States on cold-war issues.

Mr. Eisenhower will stay only four hours and 45 minutes in Tehran—enough time for a two-hour talk with the Shah and a formal lunch at which he may meet Farah Diba, the monarch's bride-to-be.

Then he will fly on to Athens, the seventh stop on his 11-nation peace mission.

The five days in India had been some of the most hectic in Mr. Eisenhower's career, but he stood the pressure amazingly well, buoyed by the cheers of hundreds of thousands who saw him as a messenger of peace. The climax came yesterday afternoon.

Standing before a sea of humanity in the vast Ram Lila Civic grounds, the President described his welcome as a "soul-stirring testimonial." And in a recorded speech broadcast to all India he said his five days here had filled him "with so much challenge, excitement and wonder that I shall never forget them."

"God bless you all."

Mr. Eisenhower and Nehru

See IKE, A8, Col. 4

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See full page image or
microfilm.

Associated Press

Barbara Eisenhower, daughter-in-law of the President, breaks into a wide smile during a press conference with women reporters in New Delhi.

IKE—From Page A1

Indian Cheers Speed Ike's Peace Tour

agreed in "intimate talks" that their nations saw eye to eye on many matters of world interest, but a final joint communique signed by both stressed that Mr. Eisenhower "did not wish to minimize the importance of, or the inherent difficulties involved in, some of the problems."

White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty said the President regarded his visit to this biggest neutral nation as "greatly successful."

The final communique signed after a private dinner asserted there was a "considerable identity of objectives" between India and America.

Nehru offered Mr. Eisenhower "the wholehearted support of India in his unremitting efforts in the cause of world peace."

The White House said the two leaders had discussed Pakistan's quarrel with India over control of the State of Kashmir and also Red China's border incursions on Indian soil, but only in general terms.

But the President implied in his afternoon speech to the million Indians gathered at the Ram Lila Civic Field that the United States was ready to offer aid to India—and that Mohandas K. Gandhi, India's emancipator and exponent of peace, himself would not have objected.

Hagerty said U. S. aid to

India figured prominently in the talks. He added Mr. Eisenhower would make recommendations to Congress on the subject. The President said he would urge more private investment in India as a land with a glowing future.

His address at Ram Lila came close to inviting India to join the United States in a military alliance.

The address and the final communique came after another rigorous day for the President.

He arose early to attend Church of India (Anglican) services with Indian President Rajendra Prasad—who never before had been in a Christian place of worship.

Then Mr. Eisenhower and Nehru flew 125 miles to Agra to see the Taj Mahal, which the President said he had wanted to see ever since he was a boy in Kansas. He stood mute before the 17th Century monument to the widow of the Shah Jehan.

Accompanied by Nehru, Mr. Eisenhower went to the village of Laramda, where he was almost mobbed by thousands of cheering Indians who draped him nose-deep in garlands.

One woman came forward and marked his brow with a red Hindu mark of good luck.

The President then flew back to New Delhi for what was perhaps the greatest reception ever given anyone in India, even the late Mahatma Gandhi.

Under 600 floodlights and 25,000 lightbulbs strung in trees a million Indians squatted patiently at the half-mile-long Ram Lila grounds. They had come by train, car, bus, oxcart, bicycle and on foot to see the man millions hailed as "the king of America."

On a rostrum decorated with a frieze of elephants, Mr. Eisenhower spoke earnestly of the need for cooperation between India and the United States.

Obviously awed by the humanity stretched out before him he quoted Gandhi that "self-government depends entirely upon our own internal

strength and upon our ability to fight against heaviest odds."

It is the right and duty of the United States, he said, "to maintain a respectable establishment for defense — our duty to join in company with like-thinking people for mutual defense."

He said "the first largest democracy on earth" (India) and the second largest (the United States) are separated by 10,000 miles geographically but are close neighbors in "our fundamental ideas and convictions about democracy."

"Freedom ultimately will be won everywhere," Mr. Eisenhower told this nation which is dedicated to the Gandhi principle of passiveness and peace.

He agreed with Gandhi that "freedom was a gift from God, a gift which cannot be forever kept from his children."

"We must search out with all free nations more effective and practical ways to strengthen the cause of peace and friendship in freedom," he declared.

EISENHOWER DOCTRINE--AS APPRAISED IN FOUR CAPITALS

Correspondents of The New York Times in London, Paris, Moscow and Cairo were asked to report on the reactions there to the United States new policy in the Middle East. Their dispatches follow:

LONDON IS CRITICAL

Special to The New York Times.
LONDON, Jan. 5—The British reaction to the new United States policy for the Middle East has ranged from restraint and somewhat qualified approval to acid suspicion of American motives. Nothing has demonstrated quite so forcibly the deterioration of relations between Britain and the United States as the tepid response to the plans emanating from Washington.

When the exact dimensions of the new policy become apparent British officials hope it will represent a "canopy plan" of United States military strength for the Middle East under protection of which the United States, and perhaps Britain, can proceed by slow stages to create economic and political conditions favoring the settlement of outstanding problems.

On the whole, the response is warmer to the general idea of United States military involvement in the area than it is to specific details of the project. For instance, no one shares the Administration's fear of armed Soviet aggression. The British are afraid of a series of Communist-inspired "nationalist" rebellions in the area. The policy, as it has been reported to the Government, concentrates on the first contingency but pays little attention to second.

These are Government views. The response of non-governmental sources to the plan has been much sharper and may be summed up in The Sunday Times' comment, "better late than never."

To many Britons it seems pe-

culiarly hypocritical of the United States to advocate the extension of American military force now to the area after two months of lecturing Britons on the use of force in Egypt.

There is a feeling in the press that specific Middle East problems are more important than general policies. The Times, London, commented: "As much interest therefore will be aroused by the American handling of the canal question over the next few weeks as by the general measure which the President recommends to Congress."

The Manchester Guardian, a strong opponent of the British policy in Egypt, was able to restrain its enthusiasm for the American policy. It would be an "illusion," The Guardian declared, "to believe that the Middle East can be consolidated without tackling the problem of Arab hostility to Israel."

PARIS SEEKS SUPPORT

Special to The New York Times.
PARIS Jan. 5—The projects of renewed diplomatic, military and economic initiatives by the United States in the Middle East have been greeted here as a long-awaited change from the negative and contradictory attitude Washington has been taxed with in the past.

When indications of such a change, involving the possible use of force, were first reported here, the comment of the important afternoon newspaper Le Monde was:

"He [President Eisenhower] might have thought of it sooner. The West would undoubtedly have been spared many trials."


For the use of force by France and Britain, coming at a time when Washington looked askance at such methods, caused a serious strain on the Western alliance. When Washington brought pressure to bear on Paris and London to halt the fighting before the latter two had reached their objectives, then to withdraw their forces, the strain was even greater.

To officials here, the reports that Washington was preparing to take action implied that the United States was beginning to understand fully the view that the Arab world was menaced by the Soviet Union.

Ideas on Nasser

Further, Washington was pictured by some French correspondents as changing from its former policy of "appeasement" of President Nasser. This last may be wishful thinking, for the French are as opposed to President Nasser as ever and consider it impossible that the West could ever base a policy of peace in the Arab world on co-operation with him.

The French also insist that their troubles in North Africa are part of the same Moslem picture. "There can be no half-alliance," M. Mollet has said, meaning that the French want to be supported in their effort to keep control in Algeria because this control is deemed essential to the West. The French see President Nasser menacing



Illingworth in The London Daily Mail
"How long for him?"

them in Algeria and behind President Nasser is Moscow. Do the United States and the West want a Communist threat on Europe's southern flank? The French hope that in revising its policy, the United States will come up with what is to them the only logical answer and act accordingly.

MOSCOW SEES A PLOT

Special to The New York Times.
MOSCOW, Jan. 5—Moscow sees President Eisenhower's new policy for the Middle East as a plot to seize economic, political and military dominance over that oil-rich and strategically important area.

To date no major editorial campaign against the "Eisenhower Doctrine" has emerged in the pages of the official newspapers here. However, it seemed only a matter of time—and probably a very short time—before all the big guns in the Soviet's propaganda arsenal open up on this target.

Reports and comments that have appeared, however, set forth Moscow's attitude unmistakably. Even before there was any talk of an "Eisenhower Doctrine"—as soon, in fact, as the United States came out in favor of a prompt cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt—the Soviet press and radio charged that Washington would seek to replace London and Paris as the dominant capital in Middle Eastern affairs.

Soviet reports from New York and Washington call the Administration's program "a new aggressive plan" aimed at "strengthening American colonial domination."

Moscow sees in this program a plot to "perpetuate the yoke of imperialism in the Near [Middle] East in the interest of American oil monopolies." They also claim it would convert the Arab world into "a constant center of military conflict."

The offer of military assistance to Middle East countries which might be threatened with a Soviet attack is described as "a smoke-screen" to conceal "America's real intentions."

Thus far, the Soviet press has

not seen fit to report that the offer of military protection by the United States would be made firm only in the case of countries that want it.

Soviet propaganda at this stage appears to have two clear objectives. One is to convince the nations of the Middle East that the American proposal contains a hidden threat to their sovereignty and independence and increases the chances of conflict in the area. The second is to create further tension between the United States and its allies by emphasizing the allegation that Washington's real purpose is to replace Britain and France in the Middle East and to assume control of their important economic interests in the area.

CAIRO HAS QUESTIONS

Special to The New York Times.
CAIRO, Jan. 5—Cairo was stirred this week by a whole new series of paradoxes arising out of Washington's proposed new policy for the Middle East.

Out of two major points of policy outlined by the Eisenhower Administration have arisen a myriad anxious questions. There was little rejoicing and much serious doubting among the supporters of President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The main question, of course, was what benefit the new Washington policy would bring to Egypt and to the Nasser regime. There were growing fears that Washington was not considering Egypt's due share.

There are growing signs that Egypt is in desperate need of foreign aid, and that the Nasser

regime is convinced this aid will not come from the Eastern bloc. However, it is equally apparent that the pressure of nationalist sensitivity still might be stronger than this need. Egypt wants aid "without political strings" and "without any infringement on her sovereignty" and "without demands for adherence to foreign-dominated pacts."

"We have no objection to economic aid so long as no conditions are imposed upon us in exchange for it, conditions likely to impair our sovereignty or restrict our liberty," an editorial article in the afternoon paper Al Messaa said on Thursday.

The newspaper Al Ahram said that economic aid had proved inadequate in the past both to the recipient and to the giver because it was not accompanied by political backing.



As for President Eisenhower's request for stand-by powers to use force if necessary against possible Soviet aggression in the Middle East, Egyptians questioned seriously the usefulness of the implied threat and urged the United States to seek to act exclusively through the United Nations.

On the question of filling the "power vacuum" Al Akhbar commented:

"Anyone who believes the Arab people would accept American influence or Soviet influence as a replacement for British and French influence does not realize that the Arabs are determined not to allow their countries to become a field of foreign influence, cold war or shooting war."

"We can ascertain that any vacuum in this region will be filled by Arab nationalism."

U.S. FOREIGN AID SINCE THE WAR



Eisenhower Gets Backing Of Saud for Mideast Plan

By Marguerite Higgins

N. Y. Herald Tribune News Service

King Saud of Saudi Arabia said yesterday the Arab world would find the Eisenhower Middle East doctrine acceptable if "the points I raised here could be clarified to them as they have been to me."

The King said in an interview that he would try to help correct past misunderstandings and pass on the correct impression of the doctrine to Middle Eastern nations.

The King was delegated by the Arab nations to find out first hand what President Eisenhower had in mind. It is natural to expect that the three other nations — Egypt, Syria and Jordan — will be influenced by the King's views.

Saud said he felt there were excellent prospects for good relations between America and the Arab world, provided the United States remained the champion of freedom and self-determination.

"We have never forgotten that the United States has freely given independence to peoples—such as the Philippines—with which it has been affiliated," he said. "We believe you have a natural sympathy for the anti-colonial struggle of the Arab nations to be free of colonial rule."

Saud said the press had greatly exaggerated the scope of Communist infiltration in the Middle East. Egypt accepted Soviet arms only because she needed weapons for self-defense and was unsuccessful in getting them elsewhere, the monarch added. He maintained the Arab world is too deeply religious to permit of any large scale Communist successes.

Saudi Arabi, he said, does not have diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, and has no intention of establishing any kind of links with the Soviet bloc.

Difficulties between the Arab world and the United States have centered mainly, according to Saud, on a belief in the Middle East that America was associating herself with colonial policies of Britain and France and that she also took sides with Israel.

But he expressed the view that United States policy in the Middle East was becoming more objective and that there was a real effort to be scrupulously fair in dealing with the Arabs.

Ike Sees No 'Setback' In Doctrine Revision

By Edward T. Folliard
Staff Reporter

THOMASVILLE, Ga., Feb. 14—President Eisenhower expects that final congressional action on his Middle East doctrine will be "entirely satisfactory," it was said in his behalf here today.

White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty, after talking to the Chief Executive at Milestone Plantation, represented him as hoping the Senate would act promptly on the resolution designed to thwart Communist adventures in the Middle East.

After the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee reported out a revised resolution on Wednesday, the President authorized Hagerty to say that he believed it gave him the authority he asked in order to use American Armed forces in the threatened area if necessary.

Some of the reports out of Washington on the action of the combined Senate committees said that they had given the President a "setback." Secretary Hagerty said today that the President himself did not think so.

The statement read by Hagerty to reporters this evening was based on a longer study of the revised Senate resolutions by the President and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

The White House statement follows:

"The President has now examined the text of the joint resolution on the Middle East as approved by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate.

"He has conferred with the Secretary of State on the wording of the resolution.

"The President feels that the Senate Committee's text is in-

tended and designed to accomplish the purpose outlined by the President in his message to the Congress of Jan. 5, 1957.

"He hopes that the Senate will act promptly and approve these purposes by a decisive vote.

"The President notes that the text adopted by two Senate Committees differ in some respects from that recommended by the Executive branch and adopted with some amendments by the House of Representatives.

"But the President has no doubt that, since both the Senate Committees' and the House version seem clearly to be intended to support the President's program, the final action will be in terms entirely satisfactory to the President."

Gen. Eisenhower again played 18 holes of golf at the Glen Arven Country Club today and in the afternoon went quail hunting with his host, Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey, John Hay Whitney, Ambassador to Great Britain, and George Allen of Washington, D. C.

The Chief Executive appears to be in excellent physical shape and to be enjoying himself immensely.

It was said at the White House before he left for Thomasville that he would be down here for "about a week." The week will be up Friday, but the President's valet, John Moaney, has not yet started packing his bags.

Hagerty said today that the President would remain here "into next week."

senhower himself. It is the President's purpose to facilitate a solution of these problems by establishing an umbrella of power over the Middle East which would lessen or eliminate both the fear and the influence of the Soviets, and there is merit in this position. But, as Mr. Acheson says, and as urged so often in these columns, it is essential to take simultaneous steps toward a solution of the problems themselves—steps far beyond the vague and confusing or still pending resolutions in the United Nations which threaten to put the Middle East in the hands of Cairo as a Moscow outpost. The Administration must move to prevent such a development.

POLICY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

Although Congressional backing of the Eisenhower Doctrine is still considered assured, the President's program is encountering a rising tide of Democratic opposition. This program is designed to keep the Middle East and its oil from falling into Soviet hands. For that purpose it warns the Soviets that the United States, in cooperation with imperiled nations and under the over-all authority of the United Nations and its principles, will use its armed forces, if necessary, to stop overt armed aggression in this area by Soviet Russia or any Middle Eastern puppet, and will meanwhile give military and economic assistance to nations desiring such assistance to help them to defend themselves.

This doctrine merely applies to the Middle East policies already approved by Congress in supporting the Truman Doctrine, the Korean war, our forty-two mutual assistance treaties and in particular the Joint Resolution on the Defense of Taiwan, which sanctioned the use of our armed forces. To reject the pending resolution would therefore be tantamount to a Congressional repudiation of these policies so far as the Middle East is concerned. Such a course, which would in effect exclude the Middle East from our "defensive perimeter," as once Korea was so excluded, would be all too likely to encourage Soviet aggression and open up a Pandora's box of evils leading to new disasters.

In the face of such considerations it is to be hoped that the Democratic opposition will heed ex-President Truman, who, in an article advertised to run in this newspaper tomorrow, supports President Eisenhower's program and would go even further. Having faced the hard decisions that led to the Truman Doctrine and the Korean war, he can well appreciate the value of Congressional backing in such affairs.

Democratic opposition, however, has been encouraged by two developments. One is the circulation by Speaker Rayburn of a vague substitute resolution which has encouraged other Congressmen to try their hand at statesmanship. The other is the testimony of ex-Secretary Acheson, who holds the new program to be unnecessary because the President already has all the authority he needs not only to extend economic and military aid, under existing legislation, but also to use troops under his constitutional powers. Mr. Acheson, therefore, would favor a simple resolution expressing Congressional interest in the Middle East. This is at best a defense of President Truman's failure to seek specific Congressional backing for the Korean war and at worst a misunderstanding of the Eisenhower Doctrine. At the same time Mr. Acheson holds the program to be too dangerous, on the ground, with caustic reference to one of Mr. Dulles' verbal slips, that it could lead us to the "brink of war." The risks of the Eisenhower program are self-evident, but thus far at least the Eisenhower Administration's warnings have served to preserve peace, while Mr. Acheson's own reticence regarding Korea failed to prevent war.

On one point Mr. Acheson is right. This is his insistence that any program should involve the solution of the Middle Eastern problems which give the Soviets their chance to intervene. The present program's shortcoming on that score is admitted by President Ei-

can military power is to be only the umbrella under which the Middle Eastern nations can be expected to develop in strength and authority to resist communism and fill the power vacuum themselves. To that end they are being offered both economic and military aid.

As President Eisenhower admits, this program does not solve the Middle Eastern problems as such, but it should help to lift the burden of fear that breeds fanaticism and thereby create a better climate in which even these tangled problems can be solved. Many questions remain to be answered. But viewing the proposal in the broadest outlines it is difficult to oppose it and impossible to find a feasible alternative to it.

THE AIM IS PEACE

Taking immediate action to counter anticipated misunderstandings and distortions of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Administration has begun a campaign to explain the aims, purposes, methods and implications of this doctrine and in particular to convince the still skeptical Middle Eastern countries of its merits. This campaign was launched yesterday by Secretary Dulles in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

As Mr. Dulles points out, the Eisenhower Doctrine is not new in principle. It merely rounds out and expands the policies first enunciated as far back as 1947 in the Truman Doctrine, and later exemplified in the Marshall Plan, the intervention in Korea, the declaration regarding protection of Taiwan and our mutual security pacts with forty-two nations. The new element is that the plan applies the same policies to the particularly difficult and vulnerable Middle East, which, in the President's words, has "abruptly reached a new and critical stage" of immense danger to itself and to the whole free world.

This danger arises because of the long-standing effort of Russian rulers, whether Czars or Bolsheviks, to dominate the Middle East in the interest of Russian power politics, and now international communism, either directly or, as in Eastern Europe, through Communist-dominated regimes. This danger, always latent, has now become acute by reason of two new factors. One is the overt Soviet exploitation of Middle Eastern rivalries, especially President Nasser's vaulting ambitions. The other is the collapse of British and French influence, which guarded the area heretofore. This collapse has created a power vacuum vis-a-vis Soviet Russia.

It is to meet this latest Soviet threat that the Eisenhower Doctrine has been proclaimed. In this lies the explanation both of its timing and of its methods. This, whatever may be said about past American policies, explains why the plan could not come "a year ago," when Britain and France were predominant in the area, and why it does not and cannot follow their methods.

As explained by both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, we seek neither political nor economic domination over any other people. For that reason, and for that reason alone, the Eisenhower Doctrine proclaims a warning to the Soviets that any Communist armed aggression against any nation in the area will be met head-on by American counter-force, and it is to give this warning instant effect that the President seeks prior Congressional sanction for the use of American military power. It is our hope that this warning alone will deter further Communist aggression.

At the same time, in contrast to British and French policies, any American military action is to be strictly circumscribed and is to be merely one means toward the desired aim. For American military power would be thrown into the breach only as a last resort—at the request and with the consent of the nation or nations attacked, and then only under the overriding authority of the United Nations and in keeping with its principles. But Ameri-

U.S. Drafting Revised Mideast Policy

By Chalmers M. Roberts Staff Reporter

The Washington Post and Times Herald (1954-1959); Sep 23, 1958; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Washington Post
pg. A1

**Administration revamps
its Mideast policy in view
of signs of political peace
among Arabs. Page A4**

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U. S. Drafting Revised Mideast Policy

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporter

The Eisenhower Administration is in the process of re-vamping its Middle East policy, now that there are signs of political peace among the Arab nations and American troops are on the way out of Lebanon.

A State Department reassessment is now working its way up to the National Security Council for final decision. There may be changes before the President gives his approval, but as of now these are the important elements:

- The decision to cooperate in Arab economic development by an Arab-run agency, already announced by the President in his U. N. speech last month.

Washington is now waiting for the Arabs to get the agency under way, with the

aid of U. N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold and World Bank President Eugene Black. Black will stop in Cairo on his way back from the Bank and Fund conference in India to discuss Arab development plans. Hammarskjold discussed this with Arab leaders on his recent trip to the area.

- Support for the Arab League as a meaningful regional organization in political as well as in economic terms.

Tunisia and Morocco have just joined the 10-nation League and there is hope here that these additions, plus the desires of such other members as Lybia, Sudan, the new regime in Iraq and Saudi Arabia all to have a voice in Arab affairs, will serve to prevent the United Arab Republic's

Gemal Abdel Nasser from completely running the show.

It is recognized here that Nasser is top dog in the Arab world. The hope is that the mutual recrimination between Cairo and Washington will end, or at least be toned down. Part of the new policy plan is to end this name-calling, insofar as Washington can do that.

Two economic steps already have been taken. Some \$5 million of aid funds, long frozen, were released to Egypt and CARE, the private charitable organization, was permitted to start shipment of some \$8 million worth of food for Egyptian school lunches.

The Tunisian and Moroccan moves in joining the League had Washington's advance blessing. Unhappily, however, for this general effort to develop what might be called antidotes to Nasserism, the United States found itself at the U. N. last week voting against the Sudanese Foreign Minister in the race for General Assembly President. There is much hope here that the Sudan will stand up for its rights in relation to Nasser's Egypt.

British Situation Unclear

Withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon soon after the installation today of President Fuad Chehab is now planned. But it is still unclear whether the British will be able to pull out of Jordan at the same time. They are not happy at being left behind once the Americans leave.

Here much will depend on the details of Hammarskjold's Mideast plan soon to be presented to the U. N. Assembly. Nasser has agreed to a U. N. "presence" in the area, a sort of roving ambassador who would "visit" Cairo and Baghdad as well. But he refused to permit having anyone stationed in Cairo.

One report is that Nasser will allow a U.N. official to be

stationed in Syria, part of the UAR, but only to route supplies overland to Jordan. The chief U.N. official is expected to be a sort of ambassador stationed in Amman, Jordan's capital.

Amman Shuffle Due

Jordan's King Hussein is expected to shuffle his Government to include some former opposition leaders, or at least to broaden its scope. But he has not yet done so. Nasser has indicated to Hammarskjold that he would not try to overthrow the King if such changes were made.

Another question, likely to be settled today, is the composition and political slant of the new Lebanese regime under President Chehab. There have been reports that Rashid Karami, a rebel leader, may be the new Premier despite opposition from followers of outgoing President Camille Chamoun.

COLD WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST NEWSPAPER ARTICLE SUMMARY

January 6, 1957

January 8, 1957

January 12, 1957

January 19, 1957

January 31, 1957

February 4, 1957

February 15, 1957

September 23, 1958

December 14, 1959

Salim Yaqub. *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. x + 377 pp. \$27.50 (paper), ISBN 978-0-8078-5508-9; \$70.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-8078-2834-2.

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Eisenhower, Nasser, and the Battle for the Arab World

Salim Yaqub's *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* is well placed in a series entitled the "New Cold War History," as the book exemplifies new trends in the study of diplomatic history. While not a major component of the book, Yaqub takes notice of the growing importance of cultural issues among diplomatic historians. More centrally, *Containing Arab Nationalism* is a prime example of a "pericentric" view of the Cold War, as it details the great impact that regional powers had on the actions of the two superpowers.

As the title clearly suggests, Yaqub sees the Eisenhower Doctrine as having an additional goal aside from its stated aim of resisting the spread of "International Communism" into the Middle East. While Washington did worry that the Soviets might exploit the "vacuum of power" that appeared in the region following Britain's humiliation in the Suez Crisis of late 1956, Yaqub argues that containing the radical form of Pan-Arab nationalism espoused by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser was an equally important aim of the Eisenhower administration. Nasser called for the Arab world to follow a policy of "positive neutralism" in regard to the Cold War and thus maintain valuable relationships with the West as well as the Eastern bloc. Although President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles did not believe that Nasser was a communist, they did think that his neutralist stance made him an unwitting pawn of the Soviet Union. *Containing Arab Nationalism* details the failed efforts of the United States to marginalize Nasser and his like-minded allies in the Arab world by promoting openly anti-communist stances from Middle Eastern nations in return for U.S. economic and military aid and even support from American troops.

As Yaqub makes clear, the January 1957 enunciation

of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which pledged the United States to assist any Middle Eastern nation that was threatened by communism, came as a direct result of the Suez Crisis. From the point of view of the United States, maintaining the free flow of oil to Western Europe and keeping the Soviets from seizing control of that oil were the main strategic goals in the region. Prior to Suez, the United States had been content to have Great Britain act as the main protector of Western interests in the area. However, British collusion with France and Israel in an attack on Egypt in late 1956, designed to reverse Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal and unseat the anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist leader, led to the United States condemning the attack and forcing the withdrawal of the invaders. With British influence in the Middle East badly compromised, Yaqub argues that the Eisenhower administration saw both a need and an opportunity to take a more active role in the region. The need to replace Britain was obvious, but Washington also believed that its support for Egypt during the Suez Crisis gave it new credibility as a friend of moderate Arab nationalism. Eisenhower and Dulles hoped that the rise in American popularity, in tandem with the brutal Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt of 1956, would induce most Arab states to declare their willingness to participate in the Eisenhower Doctrine. If Egypt and/or its close ally Syria refused to cooperate, they would be steadily isolated and Arab nationalism could be harnessed to the West.

According to Yaqub the administration's plan was fatally flawed from the start. Washington overestimated the public relations bounce that the United States received from the Suez Crisis. Arab sentiments were more upset about displaced Palestinians than massacred Hungarians, and despite the Eisen-

hower administration's often cool relations with Israel, America was still seen as a supporter of the Jewish state. Nor had the United States pressed Britain to withdraw from its remaining positions in the Persian Gulf. In addition, the conservative regimes that Washington hoped would be counterweights to Nasser (Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon in particular) all lacked popular domestic support and proved to be weak allies. The author proceeds to show how the Eisenhower Doctrine, despite some initial optimism in Washington, quickly revealed its inadequacy. In Yaqub's view, Washington missed the inherent weaknesses of the Eisenhower Doctrine, in part, because "a certain smugness had always been a feature of Eisenhower's and Dulles's foreign policy, and this was especially so in early 1957" (p. 115).

Yaqub explains that the period from the official launch of the Eisenhower Doctrine in March 1957 until the early summer of that same year saw the brief heyday of the administration's plan. There were a number of developments that gave Washington unwarranted optimism during that period despite the fact that only a handful of Middle eastern states, including Lebanon and Iraq, formally endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine. The shaky reign of a young, conservative King Hussein of Jordan survived an attempted coup by pro-Nasser forces. The party of the pro-Western president of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun, won a lopsided victory in parliamentary elections over a number of parties that did not support close association with the West. The competing Arab dynasties in Iraq and Saudi Arabia began a rapprochement, seeming to pave the way for the isolation of Nasser. However, Yaqub makes a good argument that these apparent successes masked underlying problems. While the Western-leaning Hussein had survived in Jordan, the public support for Nasserism in his country made the king unwilling to publicly embrace the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Maronite Christian Chamoun's victory in Lebanon upset the delicate balance among the various confessional groups in the country: a development that the Eisenhower administration would come to regret by the summer of 1958. Nor had Saudi Arabia and Iraq really set the stage for a conservative bloc in Arab politics. Iraq's status as the only Arab member of the British-led Baghdad Pact continued to isolate the Iraqi monarchy. Saudi Arabia's King Saud, whom Eisenhower hoped to make into the leader of a pro-Western Arab coalition, still vacillated between his desires to appease Nasserism and cement his ties to

the West.

If the deficiencies of the Eisenhower Doctrine were masked by the apparently pro-Western trend of events in the first half of 1957, Yaqub argues that Washington's failed attempt during the second half of the year to overthrow the increasingly leftist Syrian government was the first clear defeat of the doctrine. To make matters worse, Yaqub writes, the attempt to replace the Syrian government "helped unleash a regional crisis that quickly became a world crisis as well" (p. 147). While Syria was hardly dominated by communists, it established a trade relationship with Moscow in August 1957 and began to import Soviet arms: a move that alarmed Washington as well as Syria's neighbors. After a clumsy failure to engineer a military coup against the regime, Washington unsuccessfully attempted to induce the conservative Arab states to invade Syria with the support of American money and Turkish troops if necessary. However, Jordan and Iraq balked at the prospect of being seen as the tools of American policy. The president tried to convince Saudi Arabia to head an anti-Syrian bloc to halt the spread of "godless communism," but as Yaqub bitingly writes, "Saud ... had little interest in Eisenhower's jihad" (p. 162).

Having played with fire by supporting an invasion of Syria, the Eisenhower administration nearly created an uncontrollable conflagration. Against Washington's advice, Turkey insisted that it would launch a unilateral invasion of Syria if the Arab states would not act. In response to Turkish troop movements to the Syrian frontier, Moscow issued a stern warning that a Turkish attack would bring a military response from the Soviet Union. A combination of regional and UN diplomacy, and American pressure on Turkey, averted a Turkish-Syrian war and the possibility of a resulting superpower conflict, but the United States had singularly failed to replace the Syrian regime itself or rally the conservative Arab governments to achieve that goal. The final irony to the Syrian crisis, as Yaqub points out, is that once the Eisenhower administration settled on a hands-off policy of containing the government in Damascus, the Arab states, including Egypt, pushed Syria into reducing its ties to the Soviet Union because of their own aversion to communism. In the wake of the Syrian failure, President Eisenhower began to have doubts about the drive to isolate Nasser, but Dulles dissuaded him from pursuing detente with Egypt.

Eisenhower's doubts about the plan to isolate

Nasser were confirmed by the events of early 1958. Yaqub describes the first quarter of 1958 as the “Nasserist Onslaught”: a period when Nasser’s power and prestige grew in the Arab world. The book details the complex internal political forces that drove the Syrian government to seek union with Egypt. The establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958 gave Nasser control over Syria, electrified Arab nationalists throughout the region, and terrified his conservative Arab foes. The Arab Union, hastily formed by Iraq and Jordan as a conservative alternative to the radical UAR proved to be a sham, with little public support or real cooperation between the two monarchies. Saudi Arabia’s King Saud took the desperate course of trying to have Nasser assassinated. When the plot was revealed in March 1958, the moderately pro-Western Saudi king was virtually replaced by his brother, Crown Prince Faisal, who was determined not to antagonize the popular UAR leader. Faced with the growth of Nasser’s prestige, and the failure of the conservative regimes to act as a counterweight, the Eisenhower administration moved to forge better relations with Nasser and resume limited military sales and aid programs to Egypt, while downplaying public support for the pro-Western Arab governments.

However, just as the administration was on the verge of abandoning the Eisenhower Doctrine, the United States became more deeply involved in Arab politics than ever before. The apparent plan of firmly pro-Western Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, seeking to amend the constitution and run for a second term in office, sparked a low-level armed revolt by his mainly Muslim opponents in the spring of 1958. Covertly aided by the UAR, the revolt caused Chamoun to plead for Western intervention, but as Yaqub points out, the Eisenhower administration exhibited very little enthusiasm for sending in the Marines. Rescuing Chamoun, whom the administration viewed as the author of his own troubles, would upset the administration’s hopes for rapprochement with Nasser.

Despite Washington’s jaundiced view of the Lebanese president, events conspired to make support of Chamoun seem a necessity. In Jordan, King Hussein was once again threatened by a pro-Nasser coup, and on July 14 the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown by the Nasser-inspired Free Officers movement. With America’s Arab allies in such peril, the administration made the decision to intervene in Lebanon and support British intervention in Jordan. Yaqub makes

it clear that the decision was not taken lightly by Washington, as it ran counter to the emerging consensus to pull back from the Eisenhower Doctrine. Dulles predicted that there would be a terrible backlash against America in the Arab world, but that the more catastrophic alternative of taking no action would be the destruction of American credibility with all of its Cold War allies. Reluctantly Eisenhower and Dulles agreed that Chamoun had to be saved by military intervention.

The American intervention in Lebanon did allow for a peaceful transition to a new president, and did not create the firestorm that Washington feared, but the Eisenhower administration continued to retreat from the doctrine. By October 1958, a National Security Council paper (NSC 5820/1) outlined the new American policy in the Middle East. The new document named the free flow of oil and the exclusion of Soviet influence as the major U.S. goals in the region, and concluded that these were not incompatible with Arab nationalism, even radical Arab nationalism. Nasser’s recent quarrel with the Soviet Union, and his anti-communist stance in general, made it easier for the Eisenhower administration to try to work in cooperation with Pan-Arab nationalists.

While it seems of secondary importance to the author, the issue of the intersection of culture and diplomacy is addressed in the book. In his introduction, Yaqub outlines the two main schools of thought on the subject. In one camp is the “clash of civilization” view held most prominently by Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, which argues that the Muslim world is fundamentally hostile to the modern values of the West, thus making Arab-Western relations at best difficult. The other view, expressed by Edward Said and Douglas Little, is that Western racism towards Arabs has been a traditional block to close ties between the West and the Arab world. Yaqub respectfully disagrees with both of these analyses. While acknowledging the reality of cultural differences, Yaqub argues that the modernizing Nasserists and the Americans shared common values, but differed on practical issues such as Israel, European imperialism, and the level of the communist threat to the Middle East. While not dismissing the existence of Western racism towards the Arabs, Yaqub finds little evidence that Eisenhower’s policies were shaped by any underlying racist philosophy, but rather by American self-interest. On the whole he contends that, “Eisenhower’s feud with Nasser was not a conflict over values; it was a contest of interest” (p. 271).

On the whole *Containing Arab Nationalism* makes a very valuable contribution to the study of Eisenhower's foreign policy and the interaction of the Cold War and Middle Eastern politics. Yaqub does not give the administration very high marks for its management of Arab-American relations. The Eisenhower Doctrine is pictured as a plan based on obsessive fear of communist expansion in detriment to a more rational Middle Eastern policy. The administration overestimated its own political power following the Suez Crisis and underestimated the appeal of Nasser and Pan-Arab nationalism. Yaqub also shows the Eisenhower administration swinging between dangerous adventurism, such as its attempt to overthrow the Syrian government, and practical statesmanship, such as its ultimate recognition that

it was better to try to placate Nasser than to isolate him. With his exploration of inter-Arab politics, Yaqub demonstrates how both Nasser and the conservative regimes were able to capitalize on the Cold War: Nasser by playing the Soviets off against the Americans, and pro-Western leaders by exploiting Western fears of communist expansion. Yaqub's use of Arabic language sources helps him to correctly portray the Arab leaders as actors who were center stage in the regional diplomatic and domestic conflicts. The United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union all played secondary, albeit important, roles in what was mainly an Arab versus Arab, and sometimes Arab versus Jew, political drama. *Containing Arab Nationalism* is a thoroughly researched, well-argued, and clearly presented look at the rise and fall of the Eisenhower Doctrine and a vital work for any scholar interested in the topic.

If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the list discussion logs at:
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